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Are there One or Two Aleatory
Materialisms?
VITTORIO MORFINO
A LITTLE EXCURSUS CONCERNING MY PREVIOUS
INTERPRETATION
To answer the question of whether there are one or two aleatory
materialisms I will introduce and then analyse a series of texts that I
have written over the last twenty years concerning Louis Althusser’s
writings from the eighties.
In primis, I will take into consideration the ‘Introduction’ that
I wrote with Luca Pinzolo for the Italian translation of some of
Althusser’s writings from the eighties, which was published under the
title Sulmaterialismo aleatorio (On aleatorymaterialism): the collected
texts included ‘On Marxist Thought’, ‘The Underground Current of
the Materialism of the Encounter’, the two texts that appeared in the
journal Lignes on Machiavelli and Spinoza, and the ‘Portrait of a Ma-
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terialist Philosopher’.1 Thebookwas published in 2000.2 In the second
edition of 2006,3 we added the translation of the text ‘On Aleatory
Materialism’, which hadmeanwhile been published in the JournalMul-
titudes.4
Our thesis as outlined in the introduction to this volume can be
briefly summarized as the continuity between the Althusser of the
sixties and the eighties. The implicit polemical objective, although
we did not quote him, was undoubtedly an article by Antonio Negri
published in a special issue of Futur antérieur (Sur Althusser, Passages)
entitled ‘Pour Althusser. Notes sur l’évolutions de la pensée du dernier
Althusser’ (For Althusser: Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of
the Last Althusser),5 in which he identified a Kehre, or turn, in the
thought of the ‘last’ Althusser.
By contrast, Luca Pinzolo and I argued that ‘in the writings of the
80s […] Althusser takes up some of the crucial themes […] of the
great works of the 60s,Reading Capital and ForMarx: those of tempor-
ality, contradiction, and complexity’.6 To illustrate this statement, we
quoted strategic passages from Althusser’s works, such as the ‘Outline
of the Concept of Historical Time’ (1965), ‘Contradiction and Over-
determination’ (1962), and ‘On the Materialist Dialectic’ (1963), and
again the distinction between whole and totality from ‘Is It Simple to
Be a Marxist in Philosophy?’(1976).
1 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur la pensée marxiste’, in Althusser and others, Sur Althusser. Pas-
sages (Paris : L’Harmattan,1993), pp. 11–29; ‘Le Courant souterrain du matérialisme
de la rencontre’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, ed. by François Matheron, 2 vols
(Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1994–95), i (1994), pp. 539–79, in English as ‘TheUnderground
Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’, in Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the
Encounter: Later Writings, 1978–87, ed. by François Matheron and Oliver Corpet,
trans. and intro. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 163–207;
‘L’unique tradition matérialiste’, ed. by Oliver Corpet, Lignes, 18 (1993), pp. 71–119;
‘Portrait d’un philosophe matérialiste’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, i, pp. 581–
82, in English as ‘Portrait of the Materialist Philosopher’, in Althusser, Philosophy of
the Encounter, pp. 290–91.
2 Louis Althusser, Sul materialism aleatorio, ed. by Vittorio Morfino and Luca Pinzolo
(Milan: Unicopli, 2000).
3 Althusser, Sul materialism aleatorio, ed. by Morfino and Pinzolo, 2nd edn (Milan:
Mimesis, 2006).
4 Louis Althusser, ‘Du matérialisme aléatoire’,Multitude, 21.2 (2005), pp. 179–94 (p.
189).
5 Antonio Negri, ‘Pour Althusser. Notes sur l’évolutions de la pensée du dernier
Althusser’, in Althusser and others, Sur Althusser, pp. 73–96 (p. 83).
6 Vittorio Morfino and Luca Pinzolo, ‘Introduzione’, in Althusser, Sul materialism
aleatorio, pp. 7–12 (p. 8; my translation).
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In addition, we gave particular importance to a passage from
‘Contradiction and Overdetermination’ in which Althusser criticizes
theMarxist theory of revolution as the effect of a simple contradiction
between forces of production and relations of production. Concerning
the Russian Revolution (‘a result of the intense overdetermination of
the basic class contradiction’), Althusser writes: ‘we should perhaps
ask what is exceptional in this “exceptional situation”, and whether,
like all exceptions, this one does not also clarify its rule — is not,
unbeknownst to the rule, the rule itself. After all, are we not always in
exceptional situations?’.7
The conclusion of our introduction insisted precisely on this last
point: the writings of the eighties take into consideration the com-
plexity of the structure (which was at the centre of Althusser’s inves-
tigations in the sixties) from the point of view of the ‘beginnings and
genesis of such complexity’. Given this focus, the distinction between
conjuncture and conjunction emerges as important, as does (and es-
pecially so) the Epicurean model of the parallel fall of atoms and their
encounter made possible by the clinamen. It is important to emphasize
that this theme has nothing to do with the revival of a causality by
freedom in the Kantian sense, whichmoreover was always a privileged
object of Althusser’s criticism. Instead, it concerns the resumption
of the theme of complexity as always-already-given, not in the per-
spective of its revolutionary dissolution but rather of its own aleatory
constitution. In this sense, contingency is not opposed to necessity
but to teleology. The void and Epicurean atoms are not foundations
for freedom but instead the guarantee of the absence of a plan that
precedes their encounter. Nothing except the factual circumstances
of the encounter has prepared the encounter. This is the meaning of
the Althusserian insistence on void and on nothing: not a mystical
discourse that renders the void another name forGod, but the nothing
of all which is not pure facticity.8
The second text that I take into consideration is ‘Il materialismo
della pioggia di Louis Althusser. Un Lessico’ (Louis Althusser’s Ma-
terialism of the Rain: A Lexicon), which I published in Quaderni
7 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. by Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 2005), p. 104;
emphasis in the original.
8 Morfino and Pinzolo, ‘Introduzione’, pp. 10–11.
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materialisti,9 in the hope of revealing the systematic structure that
can be retraced within the fragmentary nature of the writings of the
eighties. As to the question of continuity / discontinuity, I suggested
that in these writings it was possible to identify some of the most
important themes and problems of the writings of the sixties, even if,
undoubtedly, they were contained within a totally different style:
The later texts are above all impressionistic, at times autobio-
graphical, at other times anecdotal. […] Moreover, all of the
texts cited in these essays are recalled from memory, resulting
in frequent distortions of the original sources, if not outright
inventions. These texts in no way demonstrate the systemati-
city characteristic of Althusser’s two masterpieces from the
1960s, Reading Capital and For Marx, where an entirely new
conceptuality was produced through an incisive, close reading
of Marx’s texts; here, Althusser often transforms his references
at will.10
Apart from this marked difference in style, I identified the most inter-
esting theoretical element by bringing to the fore ‘certain aspects of
the texts from the 1960s that have until now remained at the margins
(most importantly, the theme of the necessity of contingency)’:
This reclamation of earlier marginal moments in Althusser’s
text is possible due in large part to the insistent deployment






Insisting on the interpretative line of the ‘Introduction’ I have main-
tained a close correlation between the concept of void or nothing and
the concept of encounter ‘such that considering one in isolation will
result in altering the nature of both’.12
9 Vittorio Morfino, ‘Il materialismo della pioggia di Louis Althusser. Un Lessico’,
Quaderni materialisti, 1 (2002), pp. 85–108, in English as ‘An Althusserian Lexicon’,






It is precisely from this point that I reopened my reading of
the ‘last’ Althusser, in particular of ‘The Underground Current of
the Materialism of the Encounter’, in an intervention (‘Il primato
dell’incontro sulla forma’) I gave at a conference that took place in
Venice in 2004.
The two fundamental gestures I made in this intervention were
the affirmation of the rhetorical function of the void and the latent
centrality of Charles Darwin. On the void, I said:
I would like to maintain that the emphasis on the concepts
of ‘nothing,’ the ‘null’ and the ‘void’ has a purely rhetorical
function; that contingency and the aleatory are the effect of an
encounter and not of the nothing or the void. If this rhetorical
function is transformed into a theoretical proposition, it risks
transforming the theory of the encounter into a theory of the
event or of freedom.13
On Darwin:
What I would like to argue is that Althusser’s position is dia-
metrically opposed to Aristotle’s, and that the thesis that is
never written apertis verbis in ‘The Underground Current’ is
in fact its fundamental theoretical centre: the primacy of the
encounter over form. […] [This] can be read in a totally new
light when we juxtapose it with an author that Althusser refers
to only once: Charles Darwin.14
I have argued for the centrality of Darwin’s role based on the fact that
the only time his name was mentioned was in relation to a confer-
ence organized in Paris by Dominique Lecourt and Yvette Conry, in
which Lecourt presented an intervention entitled ‘Marx au crible de
Darwin’.15 In this lecture he placed the English naturalist at the highest
point of a philosophy of the encounter which would also include Epi-
curus and Machiavelli, an intervention that seemed to me at the very
least in dialogue with Althusser if not directly inspired by him.
After this little excursus, I am finally able to return to the question
posed by my title, namely whether there are ‘One or Two Aleatory
13 Vittorio Morfino, Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory between
Spinoza and Althusser (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 97.
14 Ibid., p. 104.
15 Dominique Lecourt, ‘Marx au crible de Darwin’, in De Darwin au darwinisme: science
et idéologie, ed. by Yvette Conry(Paris: Vrin, 1983), pp. 227–49.
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Materialisms’. Of course, this question resonates with —and polem-
ically opposes — an article published by François Matheron and
Yoshihiko Ichida entitled ‘Un, deux, trois, quatre, dix mille Althusser.
Considérations aléatoires sur le matérialisme aléatoire’.16 Through the
developments outlined in my introduction and the two essays I have
quoted, my answer to this question was that there was only one alea-
tory materialism in continuity with the Althusserian thought of the
sixties. And not only! When I found in some unpublished texts from
the sixties, that Althusser had used certain categories like ‘conjunction’,
‘encounter’, and ‘take hold’, I endedupbackdating aleatorymaterialism
to the sixties. Now, however, I’m asking myself whether this was the
right way to think the problem, and whether it is not necessary to first
take into consideration the role of these categories in the theoretical
context of the sixties and then confront them with the thought of the
eighties.
INSTEAD OF GENESIS
Let us first take into consideration the context in which these categor-
ies emerge in the texts from the sixties. They seem to shed light on
the question of the disjunction established inReading Capital between
genesis and structure: in other words, the disjunction between the
theory of the body, of the actual structure of society (to be even
more precise, of the mechanism that produces what Althusser calls
the ‘society-effect’), and the theory of bourgeois society as a historical
result.
It seems to me that Althusser introduced the concepts of en-
counter and conjunction to solve two problems in his theory that may
have a common origin. Firstly, his insistence on the Marxian term
Verbindung, which is translated as ‘combination’ but thought of as
‘combinatory’, did not allow him to think of the constitutive nature of
relations and, secondly and concurrently, did not allow him to clearly
conceptualize an alternative to the concept of ‘genesis’, which he, how-
16 François Matheron and Yoshihiko Ichida, ‘Un, deux, trois, quatre, dix mille Althusser.
Considérations aléatoires sur le matérialisme aléatoire’, Multitude, 21.2 (2005), pp.
167–78.
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ever, openly refused. Iwould like to address these twoproblems in turn
in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, in ‘The Object of Capital’, in particular in the chapter
dedicated to Marx’s critique of political economy, Althusser stresses
Marx’s use of the term Verbindung to think the relations of production
beyond any model of intersubjectivity.17 A Verbindung, or, to return
to the terms of the 1857 Introduction, a distribution, is ‘a certain
attribution of the means of production to the agents of production, in
a certain regular proportion fixed between, on one hand, the means
of production and, on the other, the agents of production’.18 Althusser
notes that there are even more distinctions to be found in Marx: on
the side of the means of production, there is a distinction between
the object and the instruments of production, and on the side of the
agents, there is one between the immediate agents of production and
the owners of the means of production. Althusser then concludes:
By combining or inter-relating these different elements —
labour-power, direct workers,masters who are not direct work-
ers, object of production, instruments of production, etc. —
we reach a definition of the differentmodes of productionwhich
have existed and can exist in human history.19
Here Althusser adds an important remark: this Verbindung of the pre-
existing determinate elements ‘would sincerely and truly constitute a
combinatory’.20
In the second edition from 1968, Althusser fine-tunes his analysis,
affirming that this operation ‘might make us think of a combinatory’
but that the specific nature of the relations put into play from these
different combinations define and strictly limit the field:
To obtain the different modes of production these different
elements do have to be combined, but by using specific modes
17 Louis Althusser, ‘L’objet du Capital’, in Lire le Capital (Paris: PUF, 1996), pp. 245–
418 (p. 385), in English as ‘The Object of Capital’, trans by Ben Brewster, in Reading
Capital: The Complete Edition (London: Verso, 2015), pp. 215–355 (p. 329).
18 Ibid., p. 386, eng. tr., p. 329.
19 Ibid., p. 388, eng. tr., p. 330.
20 Althusser and others, ‘Variantes de la première édition’, in Lire le Capital (Paris: PUF,
1996), pp. 635–61 (p. 645).
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of combination or ‘Verbindungen’ which are only meaningful in
the peculiar nature of the result of the combinatory.21
Why did Althusser make this correction? We can suppose that the
translation of the term Verbindung with combination and Althusser’s
further reading of this in terms of a ‘combinatory of elements’ could
make one think of a pre-existence of the elements, which then enter
into different relations in different modes of production. The correc-
tion Althusser introduces in the second edition of Reading Capital
seems to aim at avoiding the risk of thinking of invariable elements
combined in different ways in different modes of production.
Regarding the second problem, we can list a series of texts, includ-
ing the little note ‘On Genesis’, the letters to René Diaktine, and the
‘TheHumanist Controversy’. In these texts, the reason for the absence
of the concept of ‘genesis’ appears in full light. In a letter to Diaktine
dated 22 August 1966, Althusser insists at length on the question:
Whoever says genesis says the reconstitution of the process
through which a phenomenon A has actually been engendered.
That reconstitution is itself a process of knowledge: it has
meaning (as knowledge) only if it reproduces (reconstitutes)
the real process that engendered phenomenon A. You will see
immediately that whoever says genesis says from the outset
that the process of knowledge is identical in all its parts and in
their order of succession to the actual process of engendering.
[…] That means, to speak in less abstract terms, that who-
ever elaborates the genesis of a phenomenon A can follow the
tracks, in all its phases, from the origin of the actual process
of engendering without any interruption, that is, without any
discontinuity, lacuna, or break (the words hardly matter). This
immediate and total overlap […] implies the idea […] that the
subject of the real or actual process is a single and same subject,
identifiable from the origin of the process to the end.22
The ‘genesis’ paradigm therefore implies a kind of organic unity
between the concepts of ‘process of generation’, ‘origin of the process’,
‘goal or end of the process’, ‘identity of the subject of the process of
21 Althusser, ‘L’objet du Capital’, p. 388, eng. tr., p. 331.
22 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, in Louis Althusser, Écrits sur la psychanalyse
(Paris: Stock/IMEC, 1993), pp. 83–110 (pp. 83–84), in English asWritings on Psycho-
analysis: Freud and Lacan, trans. by JeffreyMehlman (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), p. 55.
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generation’, unity impregnated by the reference to an experience, the
experience of generation, ‘be it that of the child who becomes an adult
or that of the seed that becomes a vegetal or living being’. In the genetic
model, the individual we find at the end of the process, which we are
confrontedwith, is already present in the seed. According toAlthusser,
this makes the structure of each ‘genesis’ teleological:
Every genetic thought is literally obsessed by the search for a
‘birth’, with all that is entailed by the ambiguity of that word,
which presupposes […] the […] idea that what is to be ob-
served in its very birth already bears its name, already possesses
its identity, […] already exists in some manner before its own
birth in order to be born!23
Althusser adds that the concept of ‘genesis’ — as with any ideological
concept — ‘recognizes misunderstanding, that is to say, designates a
reality by covering it with a false knowledge, an illusion’. The reality
that the concept of genesis misunderstands is ‘the emergence of the
phenomenon A, radically new compared to all that precedes its own
emergence’:
Whence the imperative of a logic different from that of genesis,
but precisely to think that reality and not to dispensewith think-
ing that reality. I have for a long time now been insisting on
the necessity of constituting that new logic, which amounts to
the same thing as defining the specific forms of a materialist
dialectic.24
In a short note written exactly onemonth later on 22 September 1966,
entitled ‘On Genesis’, Althusser gave a name to this new logic which
he meant to replace the logic built around the ‘ideological (religious)
category of Genesis’. He called it the ‘theory of the encounter’ or
‘theory of the conjunction’. A privileged example, as in the letter to
Diaktine, is the logic of the constitution of the capitalist mode of
production:
23 Ibid., p. 86, eng. tr., p. 57.
24 Ibid., p. 89, eng. tr., p. 59.
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1. the elements defined by Marx ‘combine’. I prefer to say
(in order to translate the term Verbindung) that they
‘conjoin’ by ‘taking hold’ in a new structure. This struc-
ture cannot be thought, in its irruption, as the effect of a
filiation; it must be thought as the effect of a conjunction.
This new Logic has nothing to do with the linear caus-
ality of filiation or with Hegelian ‘dialectical’ causality
[…]
2. Yet each of the elements that come to be combined in the
conjunction of the new structure (in this case to hand,
accumulated money-capital; ‘free’ labour-power, that is,
labour-power divested of its work tools; and techno-
logical inventions) is itself, as such, a product, an effect.
What is important in Marx’s demonstration is that the three
elements are not contemporaneous products of one and the
same situation. In other words, it is not the feudal mode of
production which, by itself, thanks to a providential finality,
simultaneously engenders the three elements required for the
new structure to ‘take hold’. Each of these elements has its own
‘history’, or genealogy (to borrow a concept from Nietzsche’s
that Balibar has used felicitously in this connection): the three
genealogies are relatively independent. […]
Thus the genealogies of the three elements are independ-
ent of each other, and independent (in their co-existence, in
the co-existence of their respective results) of the existing
structure (the feudal mode of production). This excludes all
possibility of a resurgence of the myth of genesis.25
The plurality of genealogies in this passage indicates precisely the
opposite of genesis, that is, it indicates the emergence of a plurality of
elements that coexist but which are not contemporary effects of the
same situation.
We can find a similar critique of the concept of genesis in the
‘The Humanist Controversy’, picking up on the debate raised in the
Marxist field by what Althusser calls ‘the recent discoveries of human
palaeontology’.26 Here, the reference is to André Leroi-Gourhan and
25 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur la genèse’, in Écrits sur l’histoire (Paris: PUF, 2018), pp. 81–86
(pp. 81–82), in English as ‘On Genesis’, in History and Imperialism: Writings, 1963–
1986, trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgarian (Cambridge: Polity, 2020), pp. 33–36 (pp.
33–34).
26 Louis Althusser, ‘La querelle de l’humanisme’, in Écrits philosophiques et politiques, ii
(1995), pp. 433–532 (p. 504), in English as ‘The Humanist Controversy’, in his The
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his theory that ‘the “ancestor” of the human line’27 is a being that,while
only having a modestly developed brain, has the distinctive particu-
larity of an upright position and free hands for making instruments
under conditions which are social and not individual. These discov-
eries would seem to fill in the gap separating current human societies
from the animal origins of the human species, because from its ori-
gins onwards the human species would be constituted by beings who
lived together and produced rudimentary instruments. In this regard,
Althusser cites Jean Suret-Canalewho, on the basis of Leroi-Gourhan’s
theory, claimed that social labour is the original cause of humaniza-
tion.28 Criticizing this position on the question of anthropogenesis,
Althusser focused on the spontaneous persistence of a conception that
cannot resist associating materialism and genesis.29
Genesis signifies filiation — it signifies that we are dealing with
one individual whose transformations we can follow in the spontan-
eous form of an empiricism that weaves a continuous thread. Just as
it seems to break with a genetic scheme, the genesis of man from ape
introduces another genetic scheme within the human kingdom which
identifies the originary individual. Althusser writes:
The Originary Individual; he has been identified, he makes
‘tools’ of some unspecified sort, he lives in groups: he’s the one,
all right.30
Althusser opposes a theory of the encounter against this schema of the
‘originary’, the privileged example of which is the capitalist mode of
production as the result of a process that does not have the form of a
genesis. Remaining within the metaphor of filiation, Althusser writes:
We must go much further, and say that the Sons who count in
the historical process have no father, because they need several,
and these fathers are in their turn the sons not of a single father
[…], but of several.31
Humanist Controversy and Other Writings (1966–67), trans. by Geoffrey M. Goshgar-
ian (London: Verso, 2003), pp. 221–305 (p. 284).
27 Ibid., p. 505, eng. tr., p. 284.
28 Ibid., p. 508, eng. tr., p. 286.
29 Ibid., p. 515, tr. eng., pp. 292–93.
30 Ibid., p. 517, tr. eng., p. 294.
31 Ibid., p. 520, eng. tr., p. 296.
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As we have seen, the critique of the concept of genesis is constantly
accompanied by the historical example of primitive accumulation.32
Theother example found inAlthusser’s texts is that of the unconscious.
In the letter to Diaktine from 22 August 1966, Althusser writes:
When one wants to think through the ‘genesis’ of the un-
conscious, […] one starts with the result within knowledge,
namely, the existence of that identified ‘individual’ called the
unconscious, and elaborating the genesis of the unconscious
consists in moving back to its birth, to the point at which one
witnesses its birth, but one manages only with difficulty to rid
oneself of the idea that in a certain way, to elaborate the genesis
of the unconscious means to seek out, even before its birth, all
that already prefigures and announces it, already contains it in
person, even in the formof adraft, but that resembles it and that
is already it, that already bears its name, that is already identifi-
able […]. One has the greatest difficulty conceiving that prior
to the unconscious absolutely nothing exists that resembles the
unconscious; one always tends to recognize it in germ, as a
promise, draft, element, prefiguration, etc., before its own birth
precisely because one conceives its irruption in the form of a
birth.33
Althusser thus rejects the concepts of genesis and birth in favour of
concepts such as ‘encounter’, ‘taking hold’, ‘conjunction’. We can take
as an example this passage from theThree Notes on DiscourseTheory:
We can […] set out the elementswhich are present and ‘preside’
over the conjunction that ‘takes hold’ in the formof the uncon-
scious. […]Theelements involved exist in the characters of the
familial theatre, the familial situation: an ideological ‘situation’
in which are produced, as constitutive of this ‘situation’, the
effects of the articulation of the mother’s and father’s uncon-
scious with and in the structure of this ideological situation.
Unconsciouses articulatedwith the ideological, unconsciouses
articulated with each other by way of (in) their articulation
with the ideological: this is what constitutes the ‘situation’
that presides over the establishment of the unconscious in the
child.34
32 Cf. Althusser’s 22 August 1966 letter to René Diaktine, p. 61.
33 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, p. 87, eng. tr. p. 58.
34 Louis Althusser, ‘Trois notes sur la théorie du discours’, inÉcrits sur la psychanalyse, pp.
111–70 (pp. 146–47), in English as ‘Three Notes on the Theory of Discourses’, in The
Humanist Controversy and OtherWritings, pp. 33–84 (p. 62; emphasis in the original).
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It is interesting to remark that the concept of the ‘void’ also has a
role between the set of concepts used to substitute the scheme of the
genesis, but in very precise way, as a ‘determinate absence’:
I believe you will agree with the very general principle that
absencepossesses a certain efficacy on the condition, to be sure,
that it be not absence in general, nothingness or any other
Heideggerian ‘openness’ but a determinate absence playing a
role in the space of its absence.35
One might perhaps advance the hypothesis that this ‘theory of the
encounter’ intervenes in these texts of the sixties as a rectification of
a formalist theory of structural causality, or at least the potential risk
of such a theory. In other words, it seems to me that the functioning
of the theory of structural causality is secured by three theses: 1)
the thesis of the constitutiveness of relations; 2) the thesis of the
primacy of the encounter over the form; 3) and the thesis of plural or
differential temporality. Now, these three theses must be thought in an
intertwined fashion. In fact, T1 without T2 produces the reversibility
of genesis and structure or the impossibility of thinking the becoming
of the structure, T2 without T3 leads to think the encounter as a
discontinuous event in a unique time-line, and T3 without T1 ends
up thinking a multiplicity of unrelated times.
THE TEXTS OF THE EIGHTIES
Finally, we can address the content of the writings from the eighties,
where a series of concepts persists: the ‘encounter’, ‘taking hold’, ‘con-
stitutive relations’. This persistence may make us think that we are
dealing with the same materialism of the sixties, and the privileged
example of primitive accumulation also returns, even if the reference
to psychoanalysis and the unconscious disappear completely. I would
argue that this conceptual constellation constitutes one of the two
tendencies present in thesewritings, namelywhat I have calledhere the
materialist tendency; indeed, besides these concepts, we find others
whose history of appearance in Althusserian thought remains to be
written, for example the Deleuzian concept of ‘rhizome’, the Marxian
35 Althusser to Diaktine, 22 August 1966, p. 90, eng. tr., pp. 60–61.
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concept of interstice or the pair margin-centre. Allow me to quote a
passage on theTheses of June on the rhizome and interstice:
The world is now an unpredictable flow. If we want to give an
image, we must go back to Heraclitus (we do not bathe twice
in the same river), or Epicurus (primacy of void on the atomic
corpuscles). If we want to give a closer image, following in this
Deleuze […] we must not represent the world according to
Descartes as a hierarchical tree, but rather as a rhizome. For
me, I would prefer another image, that of Marx. Marx said:
the gods exist in the interstices of the world of Epicurus. He
added: in the same way, commercial relations existed in the
interstices of the slave world. I would say the same thing:
communist relations (communism is the end of the relations
of economic exploitation, the end of state domination and the
end of ideological mystifications) exist in the interstices of the
imperialist world.36
And here a passage on the pair margin-centre:
Marx said: the proletariat camps on the margins of bourgeois
society. And he put it in the centre, at the heart of the class
struggle of bourgeois society. What wasMarx doing? Hemade
of the margin the centre. The problem today is formally the
same. You have to make the margin the centre.37
Of course, the use of these concepts, although rare and episodic,
sketches a different tendency than the one we have designated as the
materialist one — which is rooted in the sixties’ problematic — and
whichwe could define as eschatological to the extent that it, on the one
hand, rejects the hierarchical structure of the whole (which means, at
the same time, the temporal complexity of the conjuncture) and, on
the other, and as a consequence of this, affirms communism as simple
parousia to come.
In this sense, the illuminating concept of the conflicting presence
of these two tendencies in the texts of the eighties is precisely that
of void: it is an expression of the materialist tendency if thought in a
triangulation with the concepts of clinamen and atomic elements (we
could say that void, clinamen, and atoms are the conceptual tools that
36 Louis Althusser,Thèse de juin, IMEC, ALT2. A29.60.04, p. 9.
37 Ibid., p. 12.
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render a theory of encounter or of conjunction thinkable), and within
this conceptual relationship it expresses the simple rejection of the
anteriority of the logos, of the genesis; nevertheless, when it is thought
in connectionwith the concept of world it became an expression of the
eschatological tendency (of course there are some passages in which
the two tendencies intersect each other). Here is an example:
I simply want to say that this world, empty of any assured and
stable structure, empty of theory, depoliticized to the extreme
[…] I simply want to say that this world offers itself and that it
is to take. I studied the theme of ‘fortune’ (the good occasion)
in Machiavelli, and I came to the conclusion that fortune in its
higher form is the void: the absence of obstacles.38
If we try to lend systematicity to this set of concepts (forcing them,
perhaps) it seems tome that they shape the second tendency present in
the writings on aleatory materialism (a tendency which predominates
in the writings of 1985–86), an eschatological tendency in which the
void must become full, the margins centre, the interstices worlds,
where absence does not have a determinate character but is rather the
expectation of a full parousia, which the theory of structural causality
of the sixties had considered as both impossible and imaginary:
What reigns in silence is a big wait!39
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I propose the following interpretative schema. If we take
the writings of the eighties as a whole (something that Luca Pinzolo
and I did by publishing them with the title On Aleatory Materialism)
we can find the re-elaboration of the material deposits in two different
temporal streams, the first one which comes from the years 1966–67
(I would call it the materialist tendency), the second from the years
1976–7840 (the eschatological tendency). One can perhaps ascribe to
38 Ibid., p. 10.
39 Louis Althusser, ‘Sur le matérialisme aléatoire’, p. 189.
40 I am thinking particularly of some passages on communism in Louis Althusser, Les
Vaches noires. Interview imaginaire (Paris: PUF, 2016), pp. 251–67 or on the margins
in Être marxiste en philosophie (Paris: PUF, 2015), pp. 212–16.
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the first tendency the new elaboration of the materials leavened by a
second stream, coming from the beginning of the seventies with the
courses on Rousseau and Machiavelli and the text on Imperialism.41
Of course the two tendencies produce a tension which traverses the
writings and the concepts of these years, a tension that can perhaps
explain the different, if not opposing, interpretations the writings of
these years have produced.
However, perhaps it is possible to take a step further and risk
an hypothesis that could only be proven with precise and rigorous
work on these texts, a part of which has not yet been published:42
one could try a more precise periodization of these writings by saying
that in the writings of 1982 there is a dominance of the materialist
tendency, whereas in the writings of 1985–86 there is a dominance of
the eschatological tendency.
41 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli et nous, in Ecrits philosophiques et politiques, ii, pp. 39–
167; Louis Althusser, Cours sur Rousseau, ed. by Yves Vargas (Paris: Les temps de
Cerises, 2012); Louis Althusser, ‘Sur l’impérialisme’, in Écrits sur l’histoire, pp. 103–
260. In any case an important reconstruction of this stream of thought can be found in
Stefano Pippa, Althusser and Contingency (Milan: Mimesis International, 2018).
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